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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between the economic organization of
the nuclear power industry and its performance in designing and building
nuclear power plants. The institutional relationships that link French, West
German and Japanese utilities with their nuclear plant suppliers are described
and compared. The focus is on three interrelated aspects of these
relationships: (1) the extent of utility involvement in the supply process;
(2) the extent to which the various supply functions are "horizontally"
integrated; and (3) the nature of the contracts linking the utilities and
their suppliers. The transaction cost approach provides the framework for the
analysis. The central idea underlying this approach is that important
efficiency consequences flow from decisions concerning whether to organize
transactions contractually between firms or administratively within them, and
that for any given transaction an optimal governance structure exists which
depends in a predictable way on certain attributes of the transaction.
There are substantial differences in nuclear power plant project
organization among the three countries. The transaction cost approach cannot
explain why these differences have arisen, since they are much less the
outcome of the formal economic optimization process assumed in the theory than
of state-specific factors, including industrial traditions, legal
restrictions, political initiatives and administrative planning.
Nevertheless, the approach provides qualitative insights into the economic
implications of these differences. It also provides insights into why an
organizational approach that is effective in one structural and/or national
cultural context may be more or less effective in another.
IIe
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the
economic organization of the nuclear power industry and its economic
performance in designing and building nuclear power plants. This study is
part of a larger investigation of the causes of international variations in
nuclear power industry performance. The present work is specifically
concerned with the nature of the institutional relationships that link
American, French, West German and Japanese utilities with their suppliers.
The emphasis is on three aspects of these relationships: (1) the extent of
utility involvement in the supply process; (2) the extent to which the various
supply functions are horizontally integrated; and (3) the nature of the
contracts linking the utilities and their suppliers. There are major
differences between the four countries in each of these dimensions. The
question is whether international variations in industry performance are
related to these differences, and if so, to what degree.
Several recent organizational studies of nuclear industry performance
have focused on problems of organization and management within firms
(Borcherding et al, 1980; Osborn et al, 1983; Altman et al, 1984). Other
studies have addressed the relationships between the arenate structural
features of the nuclear industry and its overall performance, with particular
reference to the impact of utility and supply industry concentration on
learning behaviour (Roberts and Burwell, 1981; Zimmerman, 1982; Lester and
McCabe, 1986). The present work, by focusing on the economic relationships
between the participants in individual projects, occupies an intermediate
level of analysis. Our intent is not to challenge the significance of either
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internal organization or aggregate industrial structure as determinants of
performance. We conjecture, however, that the economic relationships between
project participants - relationships that are shaped but not wholly determined
by the basic structure of the industry - also matter to the outcome of the
projects. Specifically, we expect that the characteristics of these interfirm
links will constrain and otherwise channel managerial and organizational
behaviour within firms in important ways. We further suggest that the outcome
of individual projects is influenced not only by the total information
available to the various participants in the project, but also by the way in
which this information is distributed between them. These issues can be
examined most effectively by taking the institutional relationships between
project participants as the basic unit of analysis.
We use the transaction cost approach, pioneered primarily by Oliver
Williamson, as the framework for our analysis.1 The central idea underlying
this approach is that important efficiency consequences flow from decisions
regarding whether to organize transactions contractually between firms (i.e..
using market mechanisms) or administratively within them (i.e., via vertical
integration). The transaction cost argument holds that for any given
transaction a governance structure (i.e., an organizational and/or contractual
design) exists that will minimize the cost of carrying out the transaction,
and that the governance structure which will achieve this economizing
objective depends in a predictable way on certain attributes of the
transaction.
1The main elements of the transaction cost approach have been presented by
Williamson in a series of books and articles over the last decade (1975,
1979, 1983, 1985).
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In this paper we shall be concerned not with why particular governance
structures have emerged in the different countries, but rather with the
implications for economic performance of these differences. Our analysis thus
differs from most previous empirical applications of transaction cost theory,
which have sought to use the theory to explain why certain observed
organizational configurations take the form they do. These explanations have
generally been premised 'on the efficacy of competition to perform a sort
between more and less efficient modes [of organization] and to shift resources
in favor of the former' (Williamson. 1985, p.22). Whatever the merits of this
assumption in general, its applicability to the case at hand is doubtful.
Utilities, of course, are regulated monopolies, largely shielded from the
forces of competition; moreover, in some countries antitrust regulations
restrict the utilities' involvement in the manufacturing and construction of
power plants.
The situation is further complicated by the special treatment that has
usually been accorded to the nuclear power sector by national governments. In
virtually every country where a major nuclear supply industry has emerged, the
government - motivated variously by considerations of national security,
economic strategy or public health and safety - played a key role in shaping
the initial industrial structure, and in many cases has remained active in the
nuclear sector. For this reason too, little stock can be placed in
explanations for observed forms of organization that rely on assumptions of
competitive decision-making.
Here, however, we are less interested in the origins than in the economic
consequences of these organizational choices. In principle there is no reason
why the same transaction cost arguments that are used to predict optimal
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organizational form cannot also shed light on the extent to which actual
arrangements depart from the optimum. We begin by summarizing the principal
elements of the transaction cost theory, and then discuss some of the
practical obstacles to its application in the present case.2
II. TRANSACTION C0ST THEORY
A firm wishing to obtain a particular good or service may decide either
to produce it internally (i.e., by vertically integrating production) or
alternatively to contract for its supply with a separate firm. If the latter
approach is adopted, there is a range of contractual mechanisms to choose from
which vary in the degree to which the parties establish specialized, durable
institutions to administer the contractual relationship. Pure 'spot' market
contracting, in which all obligations are fulfilled instantaneously, occupies
one end of this spectrum. At the other extreme are highly complex contracts
which bind the parties to a long-term relationship (i.e., bilateral
governance).
Vertical integration (unified governance) and the various forms of
external contracting differ in the incentives they provide to the participants
in transactions and also in the ease with which the governance structures can
be made to adapt to new conditions which may develop during the course of the
2The extensive literature on project management also makes frequent reference
to alternative forms of organization. (See, for example, Mason and Gonzales
(1978) on nuclear project organization, or Bennett (1985) on construction
project management more generally.) In the main, though, contributions in
this area tend either to be almost purely descriptive, in the sense that
taxonomies of organizational forms are provided with little explanation as to
why one particular structure should be chosen ahead of the others, or else
the explanations that are offered tend to be too general and the
organizational categories too broad to provide much insight into the
consequences of the sort of organizational differences occurring within the
nuclear power sector.
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transaction. Adaptability is clearly important in circumstances in which
change is likely, and hence in which adaptive, sequential decision making will
probably be required. Adaptability is usually greatest under unified
governance structures. Efficiency incentives, on the other hand, are highest
for market transactions with fixed-price contracts (these are said to preserve
'high-powered' incentives) and lowest for unified governance structures where
compensation is in the form of fixed salaries (i.e., 'low-powered'
incentives). External contracting is not always guaranteed to preserve
high-powered incentives, of course; cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts do not do
so, for example.
The essence of the transaction cost approach is to associate a given
transaction with a governance structure that will enable it to be completed
most efficiently. An efficient result, in this scheme, is one that minimizes
the sum of the ordinary roduction costs and the transaction costs. The
transaction costs are the costs of establishing and administering the supply
relationship; they are the costs of running the economic system and are the
economic equivalent, to use Williamson's analogy (1985, p.18), of friction in
physical systems. Both ex ante and ex post transaction costs must be
considered. Ex ante costs are incurred when supply agreements are drafted and
negotiated. Ex post costs include 'the setup and running costs of the
governance structure to which monitoring is assigned and to which disputes are
referred and settled; the maladaptation costs that are incurred for failure to
restore positions on the shifting contract curve; the haggling costs that
attend adjustments (or the lack thereof); and the bonding costs of effecting
secure commitments.' (Williamson, 1985, p.388).
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Which of the possible modes of governance - firms (vertical integration);
markets (contracting); or some hybrid structure - is most appropriate in a
particular situation depends on certain underlying properties of the
transaction in question. Williamson identifies three key attributes: (1) the
degree to which investments in durable, specialized assets are made in support
of the transaction; (2) the frequency of recurrence of the transaction; and
(3) the uncertainty associated with the transaction.
1. Asset Specificity:
A transaction-specific (or 'idiosyncratic') asset is one whose value
would be significantly reduced in its next best alternative application. If
substantial investments in specialized assets are required in order to
consummate a transaction there will be a 'fundamental transformation' to a
condition of bilateral monopoly between buyer and supplier once the latter is
selected, even if there had been competitive bidding among several rival
suppliers for the original contract. In turn, this sets the stage for the
possibility that one or other of the parties will exercise its monopoly power
opportunistically during the course of the transaction - that is, that it will
attempt to exploit whatever opportunities may arise to shift the terms of
trade in its favor. If there were no transaction-specific assets, either
party. if faced with opportunistic behaviour by the other, could simply
terminate the original transaction prematurely and go to the market to write a
new contract without a loss of productive value. As the degree of asset
specificity increases, however, the costs of premature termination also
increase, and therefore so does the risk that one of the parties will try to
'hold up' the other. More safeguards against such behaviour must be built
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into the contractual relationship so as to protect the supporting investment.
If the parties to the transaction were totally prescient, all possible
outcomes could be predicted and planned for in advance; and by building the
appropriate penalties and rewards into the contract, the incentives of the
parties could then be fully aligned. However, one of the key behavioural
assumptions underlying the transaction cost approach is that the parties to
the transaction display 'bounded rationality' - that is, that there are limits
on their ability to process information and solve problems. The other key
assumption, that the parties may behave opportunistically, implies, inter
alia, that full disclosure of information ex ante cannot be assumed. For both
of these reasons, instead of attempts to plan for all possibilities ahead of
time, the emphasis ex ante shifts to the creation of governance structures
designed to instill confidence in each party that the integrity of the
transaction will be preserved, even though the future (including the future
behaviour of the other party) is uncertain. A central objective of such
efforts is to establish acceptable mechanisms for settling disputes which may
arise during contract execution. These governance structures become more
elaborate and more costly to create and to sustain as the degree of asset
specificity increases. Eventually, when transaction-specific investments
exceed some threshold of importance, the option of vertical integration of the
supply function may be preferred. There is a tradeoff here. On the one hand,
the internalization of production eliminates (or at least reduces) the risks
of opportunism and hence the need for costly protective safeguards. On the
other hand, it may also entail the sacrifice of economies of scale; moreover,
by sheltering production from the rigors of direct market competition,
incentives to produce efficiently may be eroded. The scale economy penalty
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declines as the degree of asset specificity increases. In the limit, as the
human or physical assets supporting the transaction become totally
specialized, no economies of scale could be realized by an external supplier
that would not also be available to the vertically integrated firm. On the
other hand, as organizations increase in size and scope bureaucratic
inefficiencies (i.e., organizational diseconomies of scale) may arise.
Asset specificity can take several forms. Williamson (1985, p.55) lists
site specificity (i.e., colocation of buyer and seller facilities to save
transportation and/or storage costs); physical asset specificity (e.g., a
highly specialized production plant); human asset specificity (occurring as a
result, for example, of learning by doing); and dedicated assets ('general
investments that would not take place but for the prospect of selling a
significant amount of product to a particular customer' (Joskow, 1985, p.38)).
2. Frequency:
The relative attractiveness of alternative governance structures for a
given transaction will be affected by the frequency with which the transaction
is expected to recur. The more specialized the governance structure (i.e.,
the further removed it is from the limiting case of spot market contracting),
the more expensive it will be to create and sustain. These costs will be
less burdensome if the individual transactions are large and if they recur
regularly. Also, for any form of interfirm contracting, the expectation of a
high transaction frequency will strengthen reputational inhibitions on
opportunistic behavior.
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3. Uncertainty:
Governance structures vary in their ability to adapt to exogenous
disturbances. As uncertainty increases, it becomes more and more difficult
and costly to write contracts that anticipate and provide for the resolution
of all possible problems that might arise during contract execution. Beyond a
certain level of uncertainty, contracts will generally be 'incomplete', in
that not all contingencies will be specified. If a condition of asset
specificity also holds, there will consequently be an increased need for
governance structures that will protect each party against the risks of
opportunism and provide mechanisms for resolving disputes. A failure to
establish such governance structures will result in 'costly haggling and
maladaptiveness' (Williamson, 1985, p.79). However, costs will also be
incurred in setting up and sustaining these structures.
A unified governance structure (i.e., vertical integration) is generally
more flexible than when the response to external change must be negotiated
between firms. In the case of vertical integration the interests of buyer and
seller remain convergent under the new conditions, there is less need for
performance monitoring, and there is no need to engage in costly renegotiation
of interfirm agreements. Thus, given a condition of asset specificity,
vertical integration tends to be favored over market contracting when
uncertainty is large.
By matching the attributes and requirements of a given transaction with
the particular capabilities of alternative governance structures, the
transaction cost approach in principle enables the analyst to predict the form
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of organization that would minimize the sum of the production and transaction
costs. According to Williamson (1985, p.22), such predictions are facilitated
by the fact that it is only the relative size of these costs under different
governance structures and not their absolute magnitude that is important. In
practice, however, aggregation of different types of costs may be necessary,
and in such cases a purely comparative approach, in which measurement of
absolute costs can be avoided, will not suffice. For example, the choice
between vertical integration and market contracting may require a trade-off
between the lower costs of administering the supply relationship in the former
case and the latter's advantages with respect to the preservation of strong
efficiency incentives and the realization of available economies of scale.
Qualitative comparisons may indeed be possible within each cost category, but
some sort of cost calculus will be needed to make an overall comparison unless
it is clear that one type of cost dominates all others.3
Other methodological difficulties arise from the complexity of the case
at hand, The supply of a nuclear power plant generally involves not one but
many separate transactions. Thus. to the task of aggregating different cost
categories for a single transaction is added the problem of further
aggregating these costs over multiple transactions. The latter, moreover,
will depend on the form of organization that binds these transactions
3We are aware of several other empirical studies which have adopted the
transaction cost framework, including the papers by Eccles (1981), onteverde
and Teece (1982), Masten (1984), Joskow (1985) and Globerman and Schwindt
(1986). As already noted, the approach taken in these studies is to compare
observed organizational structures in a particular industry with the
predictions of transaction cost theory. Either by appropriately limiting the
scope of the theoretical application, or by stratifying the empirical data so
as to control for variations in other cost categories, or simply by qualifying
the conclusions, each one of these studies avoids the problem of combining
transaction costs with the other components of overall supply costs.
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together. In other words, both the organization of the individual
transactions and the organization of the interfaces between them must be
considered in a comprehensive efficiency analysis.
These difficulties are compounded when both organizations and outcomes
are compared across national boundaries. As in all cross-national
comparisons, attention must be paid to a great many variables - political,
cultural, historical and economic - which cannot readily be controlled for and
hence disregarded for the purposes of explaining differences. Even the
development of a self-consistent measure of performance is problematical in
this case. An obvious measure of economic performance is plant capital cost,
but because of currency and interest rate fluctuations, differences in
utility accounting practices, differences in relative factor costs, and
comnercial confidentiality, international capital cost comparisons are very
difficult to make.4
For all of these reasons, we do not attempt here a formal four-country
comparison of theoretical predictions with empirical cost estimates. We
proceed instead in two stages. First we analyse nuclear projects in Japan,
West Germany and France. The nuclear industries in these three countries are
fairly homogeneous: the economic organization of nuclear projects does not
vary widely within each country, and a single representative organizational
structure can be specified in each case. But because of the difficulties posed
by international comparisons, we use the transaction cost framework at this
stage only to gain comparative insights into the role of 'frictions' in the
economic relationships between the utilities and their suppliers in these
4Some of these difficulties have been discussed in detail in OECD (1983).
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three countries.
In the second stage, we focus on the U.S. industry. This is easily the
most heterogeneous of the four industries under consideration, and, although
the internal organizational variations are smaller than those between the four
nations, several distinct project structures can be identified. Because
differences in the political, economic and cultural context of U.S. nuclear
projects are smaller and more readily accounted for than those encountered in
cross-national comparisons, and also because self-consistent economic
comparisons of project outcomes are more straightforward, we attempt a more
quantitative comparison of the predictions of the transaction cost theory with
empirical observation at this stage. These results will be presented in a
subsequent paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III we
identify the main transactions in the nuclear power plant supply process and,
considering each of them in turn, discuss the suitability of alternative
governance structures. In Section IV we examine the performance implications
of alternative organizational configurations for the project as a whole. In
the second part of the paper, the project configurations observed in West
Germany, France and Japan are described and compared using the transaction
cost approach.
III. A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SUPPLY FUNCTIONS
Nuclear power plants are large, expensive and highly complex systems, and
the commercial arrangements for their supply are correspondingly complex. The
main 'line' functions include design and engineering, materials and equipment
procurement, equipment manufacture, construction and commissioning. Key
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project-wide technical/administrative functions include licensing, quality
assurance and overall project management. Since the primary focus of this
paper is on the economic relationships between utilities and their suppliers,
we will investigate only those transactions in which the utilities are
directly involved (i.e., first-tier supply relationships). Lower-tier
contracting strategies are not considered, though their impact on overall
efficiency may be substantial. In this section we focus on two important
functional areas in which there are major cross-national organizational
variations: design and engineering, and construction. The two are considered
separately. The question of functional integration is addressed in the next
section.
Design and engineering:
In the design and engineering process the general requirements and
preferences of the plant owner are converted into progressively more detailed
plans, culminating in engineering and architectural drawings, site layout
plans, specifications for materials and construction procedures, design and
manufacturing specifications for equipment and systems, and so on. The design
and engineering of a nuclear power plant is a lengthy, complex task, which
typically consumes thousands of man-years of effort and accounts for a
significant fraction of the total plant cost. It is important to note,
however, that the output of the design and engineering process is an
intermediate product, and a comprehensive evaluation of the economic
performance of plant designers must take into account not only the cost of
generating the design but also the costs of building and operating the plant.
Economizing on design and engineering inputs (mostly professional time) does
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not necessarily lead to economies in construction and operation.
The option of using arms-length 'spot' market transactions to commission
the design and engineering work can be quickly ruled out. The design process
involves countless decisions which require trade-offs to be made among
different objectives (e.g., cost minimization, reliability, ease of
maintenance, operability, and ease of construction). It would be
prohibitively costly and impractical for the owner to articulate all of its
conceivable preferences and disinclinations in advance. Clearly, therefore,
arrangements must be made for continuing consultations between the plant owner
and designer as design proceeds.
The specificity of the assets which support the design and engineering
process also suggests the need for a more durable, flexible contractual
relationship. The specialized investments required here mainly take the form
of human capital. (The physical capital investment requirements are fairly
modest and not highly idiosyncratic.) Members of the design team will invest
considerable effort in learning to work with and understand the expectations
of the operator, and vice versa. This knowledge may be acquired over the
course of several projects. Consequently, neither side will find it
attractive to resolve difficulties that may arise during the design process
through premature contract termination and rebidding, since for both parties
significant transition costs would be incurred. A governance structure that
provides a mechanism for 'working things out' ex post is therefore desirable.
Thus, the basic organizational choice here is between, on the one hand, a form
of external contracting in which the autonomy of the owner and the designer is
preserved but a highly specialized, durable governance structure is created
(as is the case when a utility hires an architect-engineer), and, on the other
- 15 -
hand, a unified governance structure, where the transaction is removed from
the market completely and is organized within the utility (i.e., vertical
integration).
Which of these two structures is preferable on efficiency grounds depends
on a complex set of tradeoffs involving the economies of scale and scope
associated with the design and engineering activity, the incentive attributes
and bureaucratic distortions of the two governance structures, and the
relative costs of adaptation to change in the two cases.
The economies of scale potentially available in design and engineering
will depend in part on the degree to which nuclear plant designs have been
standardized throughout the industry. If the utility industry is less
concentrated than the supply industry, external contracting will be more
advantageous from the standpoint of scale economies as standardization
increases. Moreover, if the utility is expecting to ake investments in new
plants only occasionally (as is the case for all but the largest firms), the
costs of maintaining a large internal design staff and the difficulty that
such a staff would have in keeping abreast of new technological developments
would both be substantial. In contrast, an independent designer serving
several clients and retaining the option to diversify into other industrial
sectors would be able to offer longer-term, steady employment to highly
qualified specialists and to maintain a more stable workforce, with
consequently fewer hiring and firing costs. The independent designer can also
spread the costs of developing expensive computerized design techniques over a
larger number of projects.
External contracting in principle also holds out the prospect of
preserving the 'high-powered' incentives characteristic of market transactions
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(although, as discussed below, in an uncertain environment this may not be
possible). If design is carried out internally, the utility will almost
certainly opt for a low-powered incentive scheme, involving salaried
compensation for the design team. Under a bilateral governance structure in
which high-powered incentives have been preserved, the propensity to innovate
will tend to be stronger (although there may be a bias here in favor of
labor-saving innovations in the design process itself unless the contract
expressly provides for the design firm to appropriate some of the benefits of
design improvements leading to reductions in construction and operating
costs). An independent designer serving several utilities might also be more
effective in embodying the lessons of operating experience in design
improvements by virtue of its access to a larger base of operating
information.
Against these advantages of external contracting must be set the
likelihood of closer communication between the designers and the utility's
operating department if the design function is vertically integrated.
Furthermore, the vertically integrated organization will generally respond
more efficiently to external disturbances or user-requested changes than would
a bilateral governance structure in which high-powered incentives have been
preserved: when a single firm spans both sides of the transaction, adap-
tations are possible by management fiat, without having to revise interfirm
agreements, and hence without incurring the additional costs and risks that
that entails. As uncertainty grows - the result, perhaps, of changing user
requirements, or increased regulatory activity - vertical integration thus
becomes relatively more attractive. Beyond a certain threshold of
uncertainty, in fact, it may no longer be possible to preserve high-powered
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incentives in the bilateral contracting mode. Independent design firms would
be unwilling to bear the risks, and would only be willing to supply their
services on a cost-plus-fee basis (i.e., a low-powered incentive scheme).
This is, in fact, a common arrangement for the provision of engineering
services. Scale economy considerations might still favor outside contracting
(although increased uncertainty may inhibit standardization efforts as well).
But above this threshold the bilateral governance mode can no longer claim the
efficiency and innovation advantages associated with high-powered incentives.
Moreover, compared with the design department of a utility, an independent
design firm working under a cost-plus contract will be more inclined to behave
opportunistically, for example by incurring extra costs (in response, say, to
regulatory change) which can plausibly be charged to the utility. These
tendencies will be strengthened if cost and decision auditing across firm
boundaries is less effective than internal auditing. Williamson (1985, p.154)
suggests that this is typically the case because of the stronger community of
interests between the auditor and at least some members of the internal
department being audited in preserving the overall integrity of the
organization.
Thus far we have considered design and engineering as a monolithic
activity. What if it were to be subdivided into discrete packages instead?
The appropriate institutional comparison here is between a single independent
design contractor and two or more design firms contracting separately with the
utility for the design of different sections of the plant. Suppose, first,
that high-powered incentives can be preserved in each contractual
relationship. Suppose also that the same economies of scale can be realized
in both cases. The differences, if any, will therefore be confined to
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governance cost effects. In general these costs will increase as the design
function is disaggregated. Even if the design and engineering subtasks were
technologically independent, an increase in the number of separate bids to be
solicited and evaluated and contracts to be negotiated, monitored and possibly
revised in the event of change would lead to an increase in governance costs.
In practice, however, it is more likely that the subtasks will be strongly
interdependent - that is, design choices made in one part of the plant will
typically have implications elsewhere. Thus, technological interfaces will
have to be defined explicitly during the contract negotiation stage, and
monitored thereafter. Noreover, adaptations to external change (e.g.,
regulatory change) may require simultaneous negotiations with the different
design firms in order to redefine the technological interfaces. Consequently,
governance costs are likely to increase rapidly as the design function is
subdivided.
The initial assumption made in the comparison that high-powered
incentives are preserved in each case may, however, create an unfair bias
against the disaggregated design organization. This is because the threshold
of uncertainty above which only cost-plus contracting is feasible is not
necessarily located at the same level for the two cases. Thus, at a level of
external uncertainty that exceeds this threshold for an integrated design
contract (and that would therefore dictate a cost-plus contractual
arrangement), it may still be possible to preserve high-powered incentives in
some of the contractual relationships if the design task is disaggregated.
In summary, neither external contracting nor vertical integration can be
said to offer unequivocal advantages in all circumstances for the organization
of nuclear power plant design and engineering. The preferred structure
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depends on the environment and on the industrial structure. The internal
organization option gains relative to external contracting as exogenous
uncertainty increases, as the frequency of ordering by individual utilities
increases, and as the level of concentration in the utility industry
increases. On the other hand, increases in the level of design
standardization will favor external contracting because of improved economies
of scale, provided that the utility industry is less concentrated than the
supply industry. Dividing the design function among separate firms may result
in sharp increases in transaction costs, especially in an uncertain
environment.
Construction:
Construction of a nuclear power station begins with civil engineering
work, which is followed by building erection, process system and equipment
installation, and commissioning. During much of the construction period these
tasks are carried out in parallel. Enormous volumes of material inputs and
very large numbers of electrical, structural and mechanical components are
required for these projects. During the peak of construction activity several
thousand workers are typically present on site. Many different trade
specialities are needed, and the work and scheduling of each type of craft
labor must be carefully coordinated with the others. The stringent quality
standards on nuclear construction demand that virtually every activity be
meticulously documented. The projects require highly advanced construction
techniques and management systems, and usually take from five to ten years to
complete. Few other types of construction project are comparable in either
scale or complexity.
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Four possible organizational configurations are shown in Figure 1,
arranged in order of increasing utility participation. In the first approach
(A), the utility contracts with a general contractor for the construction of
the entire plant. The general contractor may do all of the work with labor on
its own payroll, or, more likely, subcontract some of it to specialty firms.
In either case, the general contractor typically also acts as construction
manager, with responsibility for materials procurement, hiring and supervising
labor, scheduling tasks and deliveries, and ensuring that the project is
proceeding within time and budgetary constraints.
In the second approach (B), the utility engages a construction management
firm to act as its agent. The construction manager oversees all site
activities. It draws up detailed installation schedules, establishes site
construction procedures, hires and supervises construction and craft labor,
and is responsible for the selection and coordination of specialty
contractors, for materials procurement and for cost control. The contractors
enter into contracts directly with the utility, however.
The third approach (C) is a variation of the second, in which the utility
acts as its own construction manager. In the final alternative (D), the
utility actually undertakes a substantial portion of the construction work
with labor and supervisory staff on its own payroll, with help from specialty
subcontractors as required.
5The nature of the lower tiers of the construction organization (i.e., the
relationships between primary and secondary contractors and between the
contractors and craft and unskilled labor) also have important efficiency
implications. (For a valuable discussion of these issues, see Eccles
(1981).) In keeping with the principal focus of this paper, however, our
investigation of the vertical structure of construction organization will
extend only to the first tier of supply relationship linking the utility to
its primary contractors.
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We defer consideration of Alternative B. since in none of the three
countries considered here do the utilities employ agent-managers. (In the
U.S., by contrast, agent-managers have been ubiquitous in power plant
projects.) The remaining alternatives constitute a spectrum of levels of
utility participation, with Alternative D itself being made up of a continuum
of possibilities.
It is difficult to generalize about the transactional attributes of the
many tasks involved in nuclear power plant construction. As with design and
engineering, the physical assets required are fairly modest and, by and large,
not highly idiosyncratic. There are, however, some important exceptions, such
as specialized heavy lifting equipment, on-site prefabrication shops, and
other temporary site construction facilities. Human asset specificity may be
more important. Construction tradespeople must invest a substantial amount of
time in learning site procedures (including quality assurance programs) and in
learning to work with each other, as well as with design engineers, equipment
and material suppliers, and the construction management organization. Human
asset specificity is most pronounced for the construction management function;
a change in the identity of the construction management organization during
the course of the project would be particularly disruptive and costly.
Compared with mass production and process technologies, external
uncertainties are typically greater for construction projects, and this is
especially true for nuclear power plant construction, where the effects of
changing regulatory requirements and public opposition often dominate the more
conventional uncertainties concerning site conditions, labor availability,
weather, and so on.
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Each of the possible organizational configurations can claim a different
set of advantages whose weighting depends on external conditions. Compared
with Alternative C, Alternative A allows scarce administrative capacity within
utility organizations to be conserved. The cost advantages of A in this
regard will be greater to the degree that the general contractor can exploit
administrative economies of scale that are unavailable to the utility. A
further advantage of A is that construction management and at least some of
the primary construction trades are vertically integrated. This reduces
governance costs, both because the number of competitive bidding contests is
reduced and because the costs of adaptation to change will generally be lower
than if the adjustments have to be made across market interfaces.
On the other hand, Alternative C may provide the utility with cost and
quality control advantages over A, especially if in case A the utility is
obliged to engage the general contractor on a cost-plus basis. (The
willingness of the general contractor to share the risks of construction will
depend on its perception of the external uncertainties bearing on the project,
together with its own competitive environment.) Even with risk-sharing, the
general contractor will have substantially more complete knowledge of the
project than the utility, and such information asymmetries may promote
opportunistic behaviour. The risk of opportunism will be enhanced if there is
a low probability of repeat business. Bad behaviour by the contractors will
tend to be a lesser risk in the case of C, by virtue of the utility's more
active participation, but may still be a factor where the contracts create
imperfect incentives for cost and quality performance.
Compared with Alternative C, D offers the benefit of greater adaptability
- a feature which gains in importance as external uncertainties mount - and a
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lower risk of opportunism. The reassignment of labor to new tasks as the need
arises may be easier to accomplish if the workers are on the utility payroll
than if they are hired to perform specific tasks under specialty contracts,
especially if the contract labor is unionized. But these advantages are
achieved at the cost of lost scale economies (for all but the largest
utilities) and the weakened performance incentives and bureaucratic
inefficiencies that tend to be associated with the direct employment of
special trades.
IV. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SUPPLY FUNCTIONS
Of the project functions (i.e., design and engineering, procurement,
equipment manufacture, construction contracting, commissioning, licensing,
quality assurance, project management) that are not performed internally by
the utility, to what extent is it desirable to subdivide the work among
independent contractors? At one end of the spectrum, all of the functions are
incorporated within a single work package. (If. in addition, the utility's
own involvement is small, the resulting arrangement constitutes a turnkey
project.) At the other extreme, contracts for separate work packages are let
directly between the utility and a large number of specialty contractors.
The performance implications of this choice can again be examined using the
transaction cost framework.
6In practice, of course, a particular utility's perceived options will
generally only extend a short way along this spectrum; its choices at any
particular time will be constrained by tradition, by the structural
characteristics of the supply industry at that point, and by its internal
manpower resources. Our purpose at this stage, however, is to explore the
consequences of the full range of alternatives in a general way, without
reference for the moment to the constraints imposed by particular
circumstances.
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In general, an increase in the number of independent work packages
results in an increase in both ex ante and ex post transaction costs. As the
number of work packages increases, so too does the number of bids to be
solicited and evaluated. For each package, moreover, the scope of work must
be specified in enough detail to permit the cost and schedule impacts of any
change in scope to be determined. The complexity of this task increases with
the number of discrete packages. Furthermore, because of the technical
interdependencies between different plant systems and components, a change in
work scope in one area is likely to affect several other work packages,
necessitating a complex, coupled set of negotiations with separate suppliers
in order to redefine contractual objectives and allocate incremental costs
should changes actually occur.
We have already discussed the implications of disaggregating technically
interdependent activities within functional areas. Similar arguments apply to
the organization of the different functions. Engineering, equipment
manufacture, procurement and construction overlap in time, and are linked at a
vast number of technical interfaces. Some of the coordination problems have
been summarized by Sailer et al (1980, p. 247):
The architect-engineer designs the power plant system by system. Those
responsible for construction, on the other hand, build by area or elevation
and by craft or trade. The architect-engineer designs from the roof down,
calculating loads and then designing the foundations for these loads.
Construction, however, works from the ground up. Interface problems that
require careful definition and control of information exchange also exist
among the engineering disciplines involved in the design phase. The systems
produce the power, while the structures support the equipment within the
systems. Since the structures must be constructed first they should
theoretically also be designed first. However, because of the need for
information on equipment location, loads, and load combinations, structures
cannot be designed in detail until after the systems have been designed in
detail. In this regard, it is often necessary to place certain equipment
purchase orders very early in order to obtain the vendor drawings to be
completed. In the case of feedwater heaters and large pumps, for instance,
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the vendor drawings provide information about loadings on structural
foundations, bolt spacing for embedments, pipe routings and connections, and
electrical information.
Similarly (p. 260):
It is extremely important, for instance, that the construction method which
is to be used be communicated to the design engineer. As an example, the
major nuclear steam supply system vessels (such as the reactor vessel or
steam generator) may be rigged by using a gantry type rig, a polar crane or
a stiff leg derrick. Each of these will affect the structural design of the
buildings involved in a different manner. In a similar fashion, design
restrictions such as the designer's decision to limit the use of the turbine
room crane until the turbine room floor is poured and cured (to ensure
structural integrity) must be properly communicated to the construction
engineer.
An important corollary of the transaction cost increases caused by
lateral disaggregation is that proportionally more of these costs must be
borne by the utility. In the limit of complete horizontal integration, the
task of defining and coordinating the organizational and technical interfaces
between supply functions is the exclusive responsibility of the turnkey
supplier. As the number of suppliers separately contracting with the utility
increases. however, more of the burden of ensuring efficient coordination
shifts to the utility; more of the project information must flow through the
utility, which typically also plays a greater role in project scheduling and
cost control.
The problem of measuring the performance of individual firms is also
compounded as lateral disaggregation increases, adding further to the
transaction costs. The combination of technical complexity, system
interdependence and multiple contractors means that in many cases it will
prove difficult to hold a single supplier unambiguously responsible for poor
performance. One inevitable result is to restrict the scope of warranty
coverage; suppliers will be unwilling to guarantee the performance of their
products if this is likely to be compromised by non-identifiable actions of
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others. Beyond this, such measurement problems will tend to erode
reputational constraints on opportunistic behaviour.
A further consequence of lateral disaggregation is to reduce incentives
for certain kinds of innovations requiring coordinated action across
functional interfaces. Consider, for example, modular construction
techniques, whose potential for reducing construction lead-times is widely
recognized, and which are increasingly in evidence (see, for example, Ikegame
and Kanai, 1986). A program of modularization entails coordinated actions by
designers, equipment manufacturers and constructors. One of its impacts is to
shift work from the plant site to the shop floor. The benefits are thus not
uniformly distributed, and adoption of modular construction techniques is less
likely where separate firms undertake these various functions than if a single
firm can capture all of the benefits.
Other factors favor a certain amount of lateral disaggregation, however.
Restricting invitations to bid on nuclear projects to turnkey plant suppliers
limits the effectiveness of competition as a factor in keeping costs down,
since so few contractors are capable of bidding on a package of such breadth.
Moreover, early in the life of the project the utility may be either unable or
unwilling to define the work scope with enough precision and with sufficient
guarantees of stability for the full-scope contractor to be prepared to offer
a firm-price bid. In contrast, if a large number of work packages are
employed, some can be deferred and hence defined in sufficient detail to
elicit firm-price bids from prospective suppliers, thereby at least partially
preserving high-powered incentives. Furthermore, by subdividing the work
packages the utility has additional flexibility to specify the contracts in
such a way as to maximize the number of suppliers capable of bidding on them.
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By separating the packages according to the level of quality assurance that is
required, for example, contractors that have chosen not to acquire nuclear
certification will be able to bid on some parts of the project from which they
might otherwise have been excluded (Theodore Barry and Associates, 1979).
Finally, as the utility takes on more of the risk and responsibility for
project coordination, it avoids having to pay the risk premium figured in the
price quoted by a general contractor. These risk premiums are often inflated
in the presence of information asymmetries. Thus, increased lateral
disaggregation can provide a cost advantage as long as the utility has
adequate internal coordination capabilities and does not have to sacrifice
important scale economies.
Alternative Models of Project Organization:
We next introduce four alternative organizational models for nuclear
power plant projects. The models, shown schematically in Figure 2, range from
the highly integrated (Model I) to the highly disaggregated (Model IV). In
Model I a single turnkey supplier is responsible for all of the main
functions, including architect-engineering, equipment manufacture and
construction. In Model II, each of these three functions is organized under
separate direct contracts with the utility; engineering and construction
services are each procured from a single contractor, but several separate
contracts are signed with equipment and component manufacturers. Model III is
more disaggregated, with either the engineering and the construction functions
(it is not necessary at this stage to specify which) also subdivided among
several separate contractors. Finally, in Model IV all three primary
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functions are subdivided among multiple contractors.7
These four models span the actual range of organizational structures
observed in the countries under consideration. As we shall see, the situation
in West Germany, where a turnkey contractor supplies goods and services
amounting to over 90X of the total cost of the plant, is most closely
approximated by Model I. Japanese nuclear projects are also best described by
Model I, although the Japanese turnkey contracts are less comprehensive than
their German counterparts. In France. by contrast, the state utility,
Electricite de France, deals directly with hundreds of contractors. (U.S.
nuclear projects exhibit a range of intermediate organizational forms.) These
various project structures are described in more detail in Section VI.
V. SUMMARY
The organizational choice problem for utilities embarking on nuclear
power plant projects has three interrelated aspects: Which functions should
be carried out internally and which should be performed by external
contractors? To what extent should the work that is contracted out be
subdivided into separate work packages? And what contractual terms should
govern these external supply relationships?
7Note that these models are defined without specifying the primary
contractors' subcontracting strategies. It should once again be stressed
(see footnote 5) that these may have a major impact on overall project
performance. However, the focus of the present inquiry is on the efficiency
implications of the degree of disaggregation in utility-primary contractor
relations, and our working assumption is that sub-tier performance
efficiencies are invariant with respect to this factor.
- 29 -
The transaction cost approach provides insights into the economic
consequences of these decisions. Because of the scale and complexity of
nuclear projects, an essentially infinite number of possible organizational
configurations can be imagined. In practice, however, the decisions taken by
utilities on these matters are constrained by many factors, including
corporate traditions, antitrust restrictions, available internal manpower
resources, and the current organization of the supply sector (itself at least
partly the result of earlier decisions of the same kind).
According to the transaction cost approach, the optimal organizational
arrangement is that which minimizes the sum of the ordinary production costs
and the costs of administering the supply process. Based on the preceding
analysis, there appears to be no organizational form that can claim
superiority under all circumstances. Rather, the relative attractiveness of
alternative forms is determined by the interaction of the technical
characteristics of nuclear power plant construction with the basic structural
features of the nuclear power industry and certain key attributes of the
external environment. How these factors combine to influence the choice of
organization is summarized in the following paragraphs:
1. Vertical Structure
The internalization of design and/or construction tasks by utilities
reduces the likelihood of costly incentive misalignments. It also facilitates
vital communications between plant operators and design and/or construction
engineers. And it results in an organizational structure that responds more
flexibly to external changes. On the other hand, a vertically integrated
governance structure may result in the weakening of high-powered efficiency
incentives, and may also entail the sacrifice of available economies of scale.
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The size of the latter penalty will depend on the relative concentration
levels in the utility sector and on the supply side.
2. Supply-Side Structure:
A reduction in the number of separate contracts and independent project
participants yields ex ante and ex post transaction cost savings overall, and
reduces the administrative burden on the utility or its project manager.
Functional integration may also encourage innovations involving more than one
functional area which might otherwise be inhibited by the inability of
separate suppliers to appropriate enough of the benefits. Also, a decline in
the number of independent participants reduces performance measurement
problems and hence strengthens reputational constraints on opportunistic
behavior.
But as the contractual scope of supply is reduced, more firms will be
capable of bidding on the work package, thereby increasing the effectiveness
of market competition as a factor promoting good contractor performance.
Also, by disaggregating the work packages and distributing the various bidding
contests over time, the individual tasks can be specified with precision and
the need for ex post revisions minimized; in this way high-powered incentives
can be more readily maintained. Finally, increased lateral disaggregation
reduces informational asymmetries between the utilities and their contractors;
one consequence is to reduce the possibility of inflated risk premiums (a form
of contractor opportunism).
3. External Environment:
Exogenous changes occurring during project implementation may either
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increase or reduce ordinary production costs but invariably result in higher
transaction costs. The transaction cost effect is a strong function of the
number of independent participants in the project. Consequently, the more
changeable the external environment the stronger the case for an integrated
project structure.8 (This can occur through vertical integration by the
utility or functional integration on the supply side, or through some
combination of the two.)
4. The General Trading Context:
The ranking of alternative forms of organization frequently hinges on a
trade-off between production and transaction cost economies. Transaction
costs are at least partly determined by the prevailing commercial culture; the
general level of tolerance for opportunistic behaviour, for example, varies
between societies. Cultural differences may therefore strongly influence the
desired form of organzation.
VI. THE NUIXLEAR POWER INXiSRY IN WEST GERMANY. JAPAN AND FRANCE
We next describe the economic organization of nuclear power projects in
West Germany, Japan and France, and then interpret these data using the
transaction cost framework.9
8Note that uncertainty about the prospects for future projects leads to the
opposite strategy - spreading the risk of investment in specialized
productive capacity over as many independent firms as possible.
Unfortunately, the two types of uncertainty may be coincident.
9The information presented in the following sections was obtained mostly
during a series of interviews conducted by the authors in France and West
Germany in early 1986 and in Japan in 1983, 1984, and 1987. The interviews
took place with the understanding that specific remarks would neither be
attributed to individuals nor to the organizations with which they were
associated. A list of those organizations is provided in the Appendix.
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The development of nuclear energy in these three countries has followed
broadly similar paths. None of the three is well endowed with indigenous
fossil fuel resources, and in each case vigorous efforts were made to expand
the role of nuclear power following the world oil market disruptions of the
early 1970s. Today, nuclear plants are making important contributions to all
three countries' electricity supplies. Both the absolute size and fractional
contribution of the nuclear industry are greatest in France, where 44 nuclear
power reactors produced almost 65% of that nation's electricity in 1985. In
Japan in the same year 32 power reactors provided 22% of the electricity,
while in West Germany the corresponding figures were 16 reactors and 31X.
Power plants of the light water reactor (LWR) type are the mainstay of
all three nations' nuclear programs. Though LWR technology was originally
introduced into each country from the United States, self-sufficient,
technologically advanced nuclear power plant supply industries have
subsequently been developed in each case.
Yet there have also been notable differences between the three countries
in the structure of both the electric power and nuclear power plant supply
industries, as well as in the political and regulatory climate for nuclear
energy development.
Electric power sector:
In France, 90% of the electricity is generated by the state-owned
utility, Electricit6 de France (EdF). EdF is the sole owner of commercial
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nuclear power plants, and has taken the lead in implementing a program of
nuclear plant design standardization featuring pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) going well beyond anything of the sort achieved elsewhere. Since the
mid-1970s, EdF's practice has been to build long series ('tranches') of almost
identical plants. The first of these tranches, launched in 1974, consists of
eighteen 900 megawatt units. The design was closely modelled after a
Westinghouse reactor system design of the period. A second tranche of ten 900
megawatt units, very similar in most respects to the first, was initiated in
1977. The third series consists of twenty 1300 megawatt reactors, the first
of which was ordered in 1976. The most recent series, of 1450 megawatt units,
was designed in its entirety in France (the first plant of this series is not
expected to enter commercial operation until 1991). Most of the French
reactors are sited in 4-unit clusters although more recently there has been a
shift to 2-unit stations.
The electric power supply industry is much more fragmented in West
Germany. There are approximately 1000 German public utilities, which together
supply 84X of the nation's electricity. (Most of the remainder is generated by
industrial power plants.) Of these, some 328 actually generate power, and the
remainder are transmission and/or distribution entities. Eight of the largest
generating companies form the membership of the Deutsche Verbundgesellschaft
(DVG), a utility association that operates and controls access to the high
voltage network. 10 The combined service areas of the DVG members cover the
entire Federal Republic. The DVG members account for 43% of electricity sold
by German utilities, and they and their subsidiaries provide 60% of German
lOThere were originally nine members of the DVG:; in 1985, however, two of the
members, Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke (NWK) and Preussenelektra, merged.
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electrical capacity.
Ownership of nuclear plants in Germany is typically shared. As Table 1
illustrates, six of the eight DVG utilities either own or share ownership of
at least one operating unit. The largest of the utilities, Rheinisch -
WestfKlisches Elektrizittswerk (RWE), is the principal shareholder in five
nuclear projects. Most of the others are principals in two or three. In
only one case is a non-DVG utility the leading shareholder in a plant.
The degree of concentration in the Japanese electric utility industry is
intermediate between the French and German cases. Most of the electric power
is supplied by nine privately owned, vertically integrated regional electric
power companies. There are two other organizations with substantial amounts
of generating capacity, the Electric Power Development Company and the Japan
Atomic Power Company, both of which wholesale the power they generate to the
nine regional utilities.1 1
Eight of the nine regional electric power companies have at least one
nuclear power plant in operation or under construction; however, the two
largest firms, Tokyo Electric and Kansai Electric, with 10 BWRs and 9 PWRs in
service respectively, together account for almost 70X of the total installed
nuclear capacity, and provide technical leadership for the smaller,
11The Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) owns and operates large-scale
hydro and coal fired power stations and also operates transmission lines
connecting the service areas of the nine regional utilities. It is jointly
owned by the government (72X) and the nine regional utilities (28X). The
Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC), created in 1957 in order to facilitate
the introduction of nuclear technology into Japan, owns and operates four
nuclear power plants. Its main shareholders are the electric utilities
(90X) and companies belonging to Japanese nuclear power industry consortia
(8X). JAPC continues to serve as a pioneer of nuclear technology in the
Japanese context. For example, its newest plant, Tsuruga 2, is the first
Japanese plant to utilize a prestressed concrete containment vessel (POCV).
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less-experienced firms.12
Table 2 provides a summary of the role of nuclear power in each of the
three countries.
Regulatory Structure and Political Environment:
The French nuclear program has been characterized by a strong and
continuing political commitment to nuclear power development and a highly
centralized institutional structure, consisting primarily of the Ministry of
Industry, EdF, the governmental Commissariat de l'Energie Atomique (CEA) and
the sole French vendor of PWR nuclear steam supply systems, Framatome.
Decision-making on nuclear power questions has provided few opportunities for
intervention by opponents of the nuclear program, who have, in any case, found
less support for their views among the general electorate than in any other
Western nation.
Nuclear power regulation in France is the responsibility of the Central
Service for the Safety of Nuclear Installations, an administrative body which
reports to the Minister of Industry. For the utility, the regulatory
environment has generally been stable and predictable. Relations between the
industry and the regulatory authorities are cordial and collegial, and safety
issues are normally resolved with little public discussion. For the
standardized part of the plant, a single licensing review is conducted for all
of the units in the series. Where safety-related backfits have occurred, the
actions have often been taken at the utility's initiative, rather than at the
12 Partly to conserve limited technical resources, every Japanese utility
except the Japan Atomic Power Company has adhered to the practice of only
building either PWRs or Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs).
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insistence of the regulatory authorities.
In Japan, as in France, the government has been a strong and effective
supporter of nuclear power development. The Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) has played a leading role in promoting a technically
strong and financially healthy utility and nuclear supply industry. MITI is
also the main licensing authority, and is responsible for administering the
safety regulatory process.
The Japanese utilities perceive the regulatory organization not as an
inherently adversarial body, but rather as one which shares their objective of
efficient nuclear power generation. There is a high degree of informal
communication between MITI officials and utility representatives. Drafts of
all regulatory guidelines and standards are submitted by MITI for discussion
to working groups which include representatives from the utilities and the
manufacturers. In practice MITI will not implement new regulations if one
group objects strongly. Informal discussions between MITI and utility
officials also occur during the licensing process. Both utility and MITI
representatives argue that this flexible approach to regulation is possible
because of the good record of the utilities in the areas of quality assurance
(QA) and advancement of safety. The utilities have actually taken the lead in
addressing safety issues on many occasions, and often adhere to stricter
levels of safety than is required in the regulations.
Negative public opinion towards nuclear power plants has frequently
exacerbated siting problems in Japan, and in a number of cases has led to
substantial delays in construction starts. The opportunities for public
intervention rapidly decline after the siting stage, however, and public
opposition has had little impact on the implementation of nuclear projects
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once construction has begun.
In Germany, successive governments have also favored the development of
nuclear power, but direct governmental intervention in support of the nuclear
industry has been limited compared with France and Japan. Under the German
federal structure, the states have responsibility for licensing and overseeing
the safety of nuclear power plants. A unique feature of the German regulatory
process is the reliance on independent regional expert groups, known as
Technical Surveillance Associations (Technische Uberwachungsvereine, or TUVs)
for the verification of manufacturing and construction quality. The safety
regulations themselves are established at the Federal level, in a process
which typically involves negotiations among representatives of the Federal and
state governments and the nuclear industry. This process of establishing
safety standards by consensus is officially sanctioned in Germany, as compared
with the situation in Japan where a consensus is reached more informally.
Safety standards are set by the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission
(Kerntechnischer Ausschuss) which consists of representatives from five
groups: the Federal and state regulatory authorities; owners and operators;
manufacturers and constructors; independent experts (TUVs); and other
organizations with special technical knowledge. Since a 5/6 majority is
required for the adoption of a new safety standard, the opposition of just one
of the groups involved is sufficient to block its passage.
Before the introduction of the standardized Convoy design in the early
1980s, which greatly streamlined the regulatory process, as many as 22
licensing steps were required for individual projects. Under German law,
plants must meet the state-of-the-art in technology at each licensing stage.
Since the state-of-the-art was evolving rapidly in the late 1970s, plants that
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were under construction at the time experienced many design changes.
Public opposition to nuclear power in Germany has been more vocal than in
either France or Japan. In the late 1970s this opposition was reflected in
numerous court challenges involving nuclear power plants under construction,
some of which caused extensive delays. Most of the cases were finally settled
in favor of the nuclear industry. Public opposition to nuclear power abated
somewhat in the early 1980s, but differences between the major political
parties on nuclear power policy have sharpened in recent years, and since the
Chernobyl accident in March 1986 antinuclear activity has gained considerable
momentum.
VII. NCLEAR POWER PROJECT ORGANIZATION IN WEST GERMANY. JAPAN AND FRANCE
West Germany
Nuclear plants in Germany are supplied by Kraftwerk Union (KWU) on a
turnkey basis. (KWU, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens, will shortly be
re-absorbed by the parent company.) At least 90% of the total value of the
plant is included in the turnkey contract. The excluded fraction varies
somewhat from plant to plant, but typically includes items such as
administrative buildings, warehouses, water treatment systems, cooling towers
and part of the civil works. KWU takes on overall responsibility for
planning, design and construction of the plant. The level of involvement of
the utility clients varies. Some utilities have traditionally taken a more
active role in plant layout and design decisions. Since the introduction of
the standardized Convoy design in the early 1980s, however, the scope for
individual utility involvement in design decisions has diminished, although
the utilities actively participated in the development of the Convoy design
- 39 -
itself.13
Other aspects of utility involvement include contracting for the
equipment and services not covered by the turnkey contract, licensing, and
monitoring the performance of KWU. In some cases this monitoring function is
partly subcontracted out to engineering consultants. Responsibility for
quality assurance and control is largely assigned to KWU, though the utilities
generally send representatives to the manufacturing plants and to the site to
monitor quality efforts.l4 KWU is also obligated to provide all documentation
and technical data required for the licensing process, and is indeed a
co-holder of the plant license until the plant is turned over to the utility.
The number of utility personnel with technical and management responsibilities
during plant construction typically ranges from 20 to 50 - far less than the
number assigned to projects by KWU. For most cases in which the plants are
Jointly owned, one utility is assigned full technical responsibility for the
project.
Under the turnkey contracting arrangement, a fixed price is specified,
with escalation formulae indexed to input costs. (For the Convoy plants the
13The initiative for the Convoy concept came from KWU and the utilities,
although the licensing authorities and the regional TUVs were also closely
involved in its implementation. The main goal of the Convoy program was to
streamline the licensing process and to achieve design standardization among
the group of plants that were about to be constructed.
14The regional TUVs provide third-party quality assurance but the actual
responsibility for QA rests with KWU. KWU also takes complete
responsibility for monitoring the QA of its subcontractors.
15The two Philippsburg plants are an exception. These are ointly owned by
Badenwerk and EVS. Each utility owns a half share in the units, and all
technical work related to design and construction is done collaboratively.
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price is also contingent on the number of Convoy units ordered.) KWU is
responsible for meeting all relevant safety regulations and providing the
state-of-the-art in safety technology as of a contractually specified date.
To avoid ambiguity in this key area, the regulations in effect at the time, as
well as agreed-on interpretations of them, are spelled out in the contract.
The contract contains a complete description of the plant layout and the
technical specifications of components. KWU is required to pay a percentage
of the costs of design modifications and backfits occurring during
construction, even if the changes are initiated by the regulatory authorities.
The percentage is small, but is intended to deter the supplier from making
unnecessarily expensive modifications. Joint meetings between the utility,
the vendor, and the regulatory authorities to discuss the implications of
regulatory changes also provide the utility with assurances that unnecessary
expenditures are not occurring. The utility may on occasion take an active
role in subcontractor selection decisions. If the utility insists on a more
expensive subcontractor, it is generally required to pay any additional costs
incurred.
The plant is handed over to the utility after successful completion of
the trial operating period, which includes four weeks at 100% power. At this
point, several operating guarantees go into effect, as well as guarantees that
the plant was built according to agreed-on specifications and in compliance
with relevant regulations. Under the early contracts, KWU typically provided
guarantees of plant availability for the first two years of operation. If the
average availability fell below a fixed level set in the contract (reportedly
75% in at least one case) during this period, the supplier was obliged to
compensate the utility at a set rate if it could be shown that the losses were
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not caused by poor operating practices. For the more recent projects the
contracts have not included such guarantees, but general guarantees on
materials and components for periods of up to several years remain.
KWU undertakes most of the design and engineering for the turnkey section
of the plant itself, and even writes the technical specifications for those
parts of the plant that are outside the turnkey scope and for which the
utility contracts separately. Only a relatively small fraction of the systems
and components are manufactured internally; the main items are the turbine
generators, the core internals, the fuel assemblies, the fuel storage racks,
the containment locks, and the control rods and drives. Of the rest, most of
the electrical equipment and instrumentation and control systems are
subcontracted to Siemens, the parent company of KWU, and the remainder is
subcontracted out to independent equipment suppliers. KWU supervises
construction, but labor contracting is left to the subcontractors.
Procurement and cost control responsibilities are centralized at KWU
headquarters.
Japanese electric utilities have also adopted a form of turnkey
contracting for the supply of their nuclear power plants. The utility awards
a major contract to one of the three Japanese plant vendors (Mitsubishi, for
PWRs, and Toshiba or Hitachi, for BWRs) for the supply of 65-80X of the plant.
Each vendor is associated with a large industrial consortium, other members of
which also participate in the projects. Under the main plant contract, the
contractor is responsible for architect-engineering, procurement,
-42-
16
construction, preoperational testing and overall project management. The
contractor also manufactures some of the principal systems and components;
many of the others are supplied by the other members, affiliates or associates
of its consortium. Subcontracts for electrical and mechanical works and
building erection are also typically awarded to members of the consortium.
Thus, the leader of the Mitsubishi Atomic Power Group, Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, designs and manufactures the main components of the plant,
including the nuclear steam supply system; Mitsubishi Electric Corp. designs
and manufactures the instrumentation and control systems and the generator;
and Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries undertakes general design work for both
the plant and the fuel. In addition, Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel supplies the
fuel, and Mitsubishi Metal Corporation manufactures cladding tubes for the
fuel.
The utility awards a separate contract for the civil works. The civil
contractors are the largest construction companies in Japan, including Kajima,
Taisei, Shimizu Construction, Takenaka Komuten and Ohbayashi Gumi. Recently,
in response to the economic problems facing the construction industry, the
utilities have adopted the practice of awarding civil contracts to oint
ventures of these companies. The scope of the civil contract extends only to
the actual construction work. The design and engineering associated with
civil works is incorporated within the main contract, though much of it is
16The Japanese plant manufacturers have only recently acquired a plant-wide
architect-engineering capability. The first plants purchased by Japanese
utilities were ordered from U.S. vendors. The units were supplied on a
turnkey basis, with architect engineering services provided by U.S. firms.
Although later units of the same design were built with progressively
increasing participation by the Japanese plant suppliers, the first unit of
each design vintage was built by an American vendor, again with the
assistance of an American architect-engineering firm.
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subcontracted to the civil contractor. The reluctance of the large Japanese
construction companies to subcontract to Hitachi, Toshiba or Mitsubishi for
the entire scope of the civil works is reportedly the main reason for the
utilities' practice of contracting separately for civil construction.
The contracts awarded to the plant vendors are of the fixed price type,
with escalators tied to price indices. The contractor carries much of the
financial risk of delay or cost overruns, unless it can determine that changes
in safety requirements are responsible. The cost of safety-related backfits
is kept down by requiring the main contractor to pay a percentage (albeit
small) of the resulting cost overruns. In the 1970's, when the problems
experienced in operating plants led to design and material changes for plants
under construction, the utilities paid for some of the cost overruns which
were incurred in those cases where the main contractors could not have
reasonably anticipated the problem. In general, the utility and its main
contractor renegotiate their contract only a small number of times, and
backfits are treated en bloc. Since backfitting during construction has
decreased significantly in the 1980's, Japanese utilities anticipate that
there may be no renegotiations necessary for the plants coming on line in the
near future.
The prices quoted in the main contracts tend to be highly aggregated, and
the utility does not receive detailed cost breakdowns. Although the utilities
verify the technical qualifications of all the subcontractors used by the main
contractor, they do not request any cost or bidding information. Contractual
warranties are fairly standardized in Japan and are provided on materials,
components and services for 2-5 years after plant turnover depending on the
system. There is no guarantee of overall plant availability. but vendors
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frequently stand behind their products and services beyond the warranty
period.
Despite the fact that several plant and civil works contractors are
active in the Japanese market, price competition does not appear to play a
large role in the award of the major contracts, and bids are more accurately
characterized as negotiated than competitive. Like most Japanese firms, the
Japanese utilities attach a great deal of importance to the maintenance of
stable, durable relationships with their suppliers, and tend to contract
repeatedly with the same firm. This tendency is reinforced by the utilities'
practice of only building either PWRs or BWRs. Indeed, the Mitsubishi group,
as the only supplier for the PWR utilities, faces no competition, and there
are also indications that the ordering patterns of the BWR utilities have been
partly influenced by a perceived need to ensure adequate business for both BWR
suppliers.
The supply relationship extends throughout the life of the plant. The
plant vendor is typically also the primary maintenance contractor, and in some
cases undertakes as much as 70X of the maintenance work, as well as any plant
modifications.
Although the plant contractor's scope of supply is very broad, the client
utility is actively involved in all phases of the project. One official at
one of the larger utilities estimated that up to 200 utility engineering
personnel are present on site during construction of a multiple unit station
in a supervisory capacity, and a further 100 are involved in the project at
the home office. The numbers are smaller for some of the smaller utilities,
who tend to rely more heavily on the main contractor. The utilities are
especially active with respect to quality assurance, reviewing design
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documents and construction procedures and monitoring quality assurance
activities at manufacturing facilities and on the construction sites. Utility
personnel conduct their own inspections as well as witness inspections
conducted by supplier quality assurance staff at pre-specified holding points
in the construction schedule. The utility also has primary responsibility for
licensing, although it relies heavily on the main contractor to provide the
necessary documentation.
France
In France nuclear power plants are not supplied on a turnkey basis, and
the utility, Electricit6 de France (EdF), is centrally involved in the supply
process, acting as the architect-engineer, construction coordinator and
overall project manager.17 Its two principal suppliers on each project are
Framatome, for the NSSS, and Alsthom Atlantique, for the turbine-generator,
both of whom also assume responsibility for installing, testing and
commissioning their equipment under EdF supervision. Many other suppliers are
also involved, either as direct contractors to EdF or as subcontractors to the
two main suppliers. EdF enters into several hundred separate contracts for
systems, equipment and components, and electrical, mechanical and civil works.
The 15 largest contracts cover 70-75% of the total cost of the plant. In many
cases more than one contract is placed with a single supplier. Most of the
contracts (except, of course, those awarded to Framatome and Alsthom) are bid
competitively; one EdF official estimated that competitively bid contracts
17EdF is precluded from being directly involved in manufacturing or
construction by the law by which it was created in 1948. The intent of the
restrictions was to avoid nationalization of the construction industry or
the electrical equipment supply industry.
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(including subcontracts) account for 50-60% of the total direct cost of each
plant. All contracts are fixed price, with escalators indexed to input costs.
Many contracts are awarded not for a single plant but for all of the plants in
the standard series. The largest such contracts were placed in 1974 for the
units of the first 900 megawatt series (the CP1 series); orders were placed
with Framatome and Alsthom for twelve nuclear reactors and turbine generators,
with options (subsequently exercised) to purchase four more of each. As with
KWU in Germany, prices are quoted as a function of the number of units
actually ordered.
EdF's Engineering and Construction Division (Direction de 1'Equipement)
is responsible for designing and building the plants. The Division consists
of three central departments (administration, manufacturing and construction
control, and design) and five regional departments. The design function is
surprisingly decentralized. The central design department, SEPTEN, does the
preliminary design work, performs plant-wide optimization studies, writes the
general specifications for the plant series, and generally oversees the
implementation of the standardization policy, but responsibility for detailed
design and engineering rests with the five regional departments.
Each regional department is responsible for designing those parts of the
plants to be built in its area that are site-specific, and also for designing
an assigned section of the standardized portion of the plant. (The site-
specific parts of the plant vary from about 7 of total cost for a river site
to about 20% of total cost for a site with open cooling and unfavorable
terrain). Detailed design and engineering of the NSSS and turbine generator
systems are undertaken by Framatome and Alstho respectively, but
responsibility for technical coordination of the interfaces between these
- 47 -
systems and the rest of the plant rests with the EdF regional offices.
Detailed design of the auxiliary systems and the balance of plant is
undertaken by the regions themselves. The regional design assignments have
varied from one series to the next, and not all of the regional departments
have been involved in each series. The design process is coordinated by a
committee consisting of the heads of each regional department, and design
problems affecting more than one department are generally resolved at the
regional level and not by headquarters.1 8
Each regional department is also responsible for preparing and
negotiating the contracts for its assigned portion of the plant, and for
monitoring supplier performance. Division headquarters also participates in
the negotiation of the very large contracts, and provides centralized
monitoring of contract price trends. EdF's cost monitoring efforts were
recently extended to the subcontractors of its major contractors.
18Prior to the rapid expansion of the nuclear program in the early 1970s, the
power plant design process had been still more decentralized within EdF.
Although the general size and technical specifications for fossil plants had
been relatively uniform, each regional department had designed and built its
own plants. Given the demands of the massive nuclear construction program
and, especially, the expected benefits of standardization, such a
decentralized approach to design and engineering was clearly no longer
practical. On the other hand, complete centralization of the design
function within SEPIEN was also not an attractive option. SE'TEN had
previously been primarily a research and development organization. The
practical architect-engineering experience was concentrated in the regional
departments. Transferring the architect-engineering capability to SEPTEN
would have been highly disruptive, and would have weakened the existing
close links between the design and construction functions, since the latter
would still be undertaken by the regional departments. Moreover, the design
of the several standardized series overlapped in time, and the burdens on a
central organization pursuing several major design projects in parallel
would have been considerable. The organizational scheme that was chosen can
be interpreted as a compromise between the benefits of standardization and
centralization, on the one hand, and regionalization, on the other. An
interesting question is whether this will remain the most attractive
approach during a period when the design workload will be sharply reduced.
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The five regional departments are responsible for supervising the
construction of the plants built within their regions. There are typically
100 - 150 Engineering and Construction Division personnel on site for a 2-unit
project, of which over half are engaged in contractor coordination and
surveillance. Overall responsibility for quality rests with the utility,
which prescribes quality assurance programs for its contractors, and conducts
frequent quality audits both at manufacturing facilities and on site. The
plant operations staff begins to assemble at the site several years before the
plant is commissioned and participates in equipment testing and commissioning,
but overall responsibility for the plant remains with the Engineering and
Construction Division until the first connection to the grid is made. At that
point, a complete transfer of responsibility to the Operations Division takes
place.
VIII. Comparative Analysis of Project Ormanization
Table 3 summarizes the principal differences in the organization of
nuclear power plant projects in the three countries. We next examine the
economic implications of these differences using the transaction cost
framework.
The German utilities externalize a high proportion of the supply tasks,
most of which are incorporated within a single supply contract. Scale economy
considerations favor external contracting, in view of the small size of most
utilities' nuclear programs. Further, the integration of these functions
within a single turnkey contract yields several benefits, including greater
ease of coordination, fewer project coordination burdens on the utilities, and.
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fewer performance measurement problems.1 9 But these advantages must be
weighed against the transaction cost penalties associated with the potential
for opportunistic behaviour by KWU arising from its status as a powerful
monopoly supplier.
The safeguards against these hazards have taken several forms. The risk
sharing provisions of the turnkey contracts have been a major factor in
building utility confidence in the integrity of the supply arrangements.
Although KWU's contractually obligated share of the costs of unforeseen
regulatory changes has apparently fallen over time, its continuing obligation
to pay a percentage of all ex post modifications provides assurance that
unnecessary changes are not being made.20 This expedites agreement among the
parties as to what should be done, and reduces the risk of costly construction
delays caused by haggling over who should pay. A common practice is to lump
the costs of modifications into large blocks and to conduct cost allocation
negotiations between the utility and KWU at a later date.
The availability guarantees provided by KWU were reportedly an especially
important factor in building utility confidence in the early years of the
program. According to several utility spokesmen, the reason that the
guarantees did not appear in later contracts was that they had outlived their
usefulness; the operating performance of KWU plants was proven, and the
19A KWU spokesman reported that there were over 60,000 design 'interfaces'
requiring technical coordination in a PWR plant design. The nature of these
designs is such that if design responsibilities were divided among two or
more firms, many such interfaces would inevitably have to be negotiated
across corporate boundaries, however the division was made.
20In the earliest contracts KWU reportedly agreed to pay 33X of the costs of
unforeseen regulatory changes.
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guarantees were no longer worth their cost to the utilities. The remaining
guarantees for materials and components are only in effect for two years and
at least one utility spokesman suggested that they do not pose much of a
financial risk to KWU. On the other hand, KWU retains contractual
responsibility for component and construction quality and for correcting any
quality deficiencies detected during construction. Utility spokesmen stressed
that these contractual responsibilities, combined with the third-party quality
verification efforts of the TUVs, provide important assurances of the quality
of the completed plants.
Information asymmetries between the utility and KWU are reduced by the
performance monitoring teams located at utility headquarters and on site, and
also by what spokesmen for both KWU and the utilities described as close
21
communications between the utility companies. To further reduce information
asymmetries, utilities have often hired outside consultants to evaluate KWU
cost estimates (especially for backfits). More generally, the relatively
small scale of the German nuclear program, and the fairly closely knit
character of relations between the principal participants in industry and
government, have probably acted to reinforce the reputational constraints on
opportunistic behaviour by KWU. One utility spokesman suggested that although
increased competition would provide the most effective constraints on
2 1The Federal Interior Ministry at one stage considered introducing
legislation requiring each utility to designate a coordinator of
inter-utility information exchanges. This initiative was reportedly dropped
when it became clear that extensive information sharing was already taking
place informally. An important official forum for technical exchange is the
Technische Vereinigung der Grosskraftwerksbetreiber (VGB) which was
originally created to address operating problems with fossil-fueled plants
but has more recently expanded its activities to deal with nuclear power
plants.
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opportunism, KWU's aspirations for further domestic and export orders and the
reputational concerns of its parent, Siemens, had helped to prevent it from
fully exploiting its monopoly position in the past. Finally, the Convoy
program, though its primary stated purpose was to reduce regulatory
uncertainties and promote economies of scale, can also be interpreted in
transaction cost terms. The combination of regulatory stabilization and
design standardization has reduced the need for costly ex post contractual
renegotiations and hence has reduced the risk of ex ost opportunism by KWU.
The scale economy and transaction cost arguments that shed light on the
advantages of turnkey contracting in the German context also suggest why the
scope of the turnkey contract is incomplete. Separate contracts are written
for parts of the plant whose design is highly site-specific (e.g., cooling
structures). or where the freedom to choose is valued by the utility but has
little bearing on the design of the rest of the plant (e.g.. administrative
buildings and warehouses), or where the utility has long had special
competence (e.g., civil works in the case of RWE).
Further, the turnkey contract scope varies depending on the technical and
managerial resources of the client utilities, again as expected. RWE, the
industry leader, has been at the forefront of efforts to dilute the market
power of KWU. It has typically taken direct responsibility for a higher
fraction of the total plant worth than the industry average, for example
subcontracting directly with its civil engineering subsidiary for all of the
civil works. During the late 1970s. moreover, it reportedly sought to move
away from the turnkey approach towards a split package scheme, although
interest in this initiative waned following the Three Mile Island accident, as
the value of an integrated approach to plant design and engineering became
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more evident. Nevertheless, RWE's reservations about the turnkey approach
continue, and the utility has recently proposed a scheme under which KWU would
retain plant-wide responsibility for design and licensing but the utility
would be more actively involved in procurement and hence able to promote more
competition among suppliers.2 2 Predictably, the smaller utilities, who are
generally less able than RWE to do anything about these issues, have also
tended to show less concern about them, and several officials from these
companies were sceptical about the postulated economic benefits of a departure
from the turnkey concept. Since RWE is clearly viewed as the industry leader,
the other utilities are able to enjoy some of the benefits of RWE's more
activist posture towards KWU without incurring the costs, and can therefore
probably afford to take a somewhat more relaxed view of KWU's monopoly
position.
As in Germany, the general pattern in the Japanese nuclear industry has
been for the utilities to externalize most of the principal supply functions
and for the latter to be largely incorporated within a single contract.
Compared with their German counterparts, however, the Japanese utilities
appear to take a significantly more active role in coordinating, supervising
and monitoring their suppliers. The larger utilities are among the largest
and most powerful industrial corporations in Japan, and, despite the great
2 2RWE's preoccupation with the lack of competition in the supply industry is
longstanding. In 1973, it contracted with Babcock-Brown Boveri Reaktorbau
(BBR) in association with the Brown Boveri Company (BBC) for the turnkey
supply of the Nuihlheim Kirlich plant in an effort to reverse this. This
plant has encountered a number of problems during construction, however, and
is not regarded as an encouraging precedent. During the early 1970s other
utilities explored the purchase of NSSS systems from U.S. vendors, but these
discussions were discontinued when the costliness of the adjustments that
would have to be made to comply with German regulatory specifications became
evident.
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size and strength of the nuclear supply consortia, appear to deal with them on
technical matters on at least an equal footing.23
In recent years the utilities have become increasingly concerned over the
rising costs of nuclear power generation. The cost advantage relative to
fossil power plants, once substantial, has now largely disappeared according
to data recently released by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
The utilities have begun to focus more strongly on cost reduction measures,
and have let it be known that a 10X reduction in cost per unit of capacity
will be required for the next round of plant bids. Among the utilities' other
targets are the potential inefficiencies associated with the low level of
competition in the supply industry. Several utilities reported plans to
increase their influence over the subcontracting practices of their main
contractors. Tokyo Electric's announcement, in 1981, of plans to study the
feasibility of introducing KWU PWRs can similarly be interpreted as an attempt
to increase pressure on the domestic suppliers. Interestingly, however,
unlike the German utility RWE none of the Japanese utilities whom we
interviewed expressed any interest in departing from the turnkey-style
approach to contracting; indeed, all of them indicated a strong preference for
this arrangement over any alternative.
Also, the efforts to increase supply-side competition have not been
accompanied by a focus on measures to strengthen ex ost contractual
safeguards. In our interviews the utilities generally evinced little concern
over the risks of incentive misalignment and supplier opportunism during
23The utilities, led by Tokyo Electric and Kansai Electric, have, for example,
played a key technical role in the development of the latest generation of
LWR designs, the first for which the Japanese nuclear industry has had lead
technical responsibility.
- 54 -
contract implementation. Utility spokesmen pointed out that their main
contractors were well aware that the sustainability of the national policy
consensus in favor of nuclear power depends strongly on the continuation of
the nuclear cost advantage over fossil fuels, and that this should be a
powerful motivation to keep costs down. But the utilities' stated confidence
on this point must also be seen in the general context of a domestic
commercial environment in which there are powerful institutional and cultural
checks on opportunistic behaviour. Contractual relationships are typically
stable and close. A high value is placed on continuity and the preservation
of amicable relations, and the penalties associated with a loss of reputation
are correspondingly high. Williamson (1985, p.123) cites Kitagawa, an expert
on Japanese contract law, on this point:
Japanese businessmen place more emphasis on building up a personal
relationship than on drafting a detailed contract; all decisions are made by
the group rather than the individual; lawyers are usually not consulted
during the negotiations. (Kitagawa, 1980, p.1-24).
Expressed in transaction cost terms, parties enter into commercial
relationships with greater confidence in the integrity of the transactions,
and less emphasis is placed on the negotiation of formal contractual
safeguards against bad behaviour.
The French nuclear power plant supply process has been characterized by a
higher rate of reactor ordering (until recently) and a higher level of
standardization than in either Japan or West Germany. Large economies of
scale, both static and dynamic, have been realized as a result. In West
Germany, because of the fragmented structure of the utility industry and the
relatively small scale of the nuclear sector, the price of standardization was
the concentration of industrial power in the hands of a single integrated
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supplier and the various transaction cost penalties that go along with such an
arrangement. In France, by contrast, standardization has been possible
without these transaction cost penalties. Because EdF is the sole owner of
nuclear plants and because of the large scale of its nuclear program, it has
been able to internalize the project management and architect-engineering
functions, thereby economizing on transaction costs in these areas, without at
the same time sacrificing any economies of scale.
In turn, standardization has helped to reduce other transaction costs.
The placing of orders for entire plant series economizes on both the ex ante
costs of negotiating contracts and the ex post costs of contractual governance
structures. Also, the fact that very few changes in design and construction
occur over the course of a series means that ex post contract renegotiations
are in any case not common. Third, since engineering is largely completed
before manufacturing and construction of all but the first member of a plant
series has even begun, and since the likelihood of change during the series is
low, fixed price contracting for construction work is expedited. And fourth,
the high level of standardization allows meaningful measurement of contractor
performance from one ob to the next. EdF's contractors are in any case
motivated to perform well because of the strong likelihood of repeat business.
EdF's practice of awarding a relatively large number of separate work
packages has increased the ex ante contracting costs (e.g., more as well as
more detailed specifications, more bids to evaluate, etc.). But it has also
worked to EdF's advantage in that the precise specification of individual work
packages has further facilitated fixed-price bidding. Moreover, this
disaggregated approach to procurement has given EdF greater flexibility to
achieve the optimal balance between the exploitation of competition, on the
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one hand, and economies of scale, on the other. Thus, in areas such as NSSS
and turbine generator supply, where static scale economies and learning
effects were expected to be large, EdF has directed its procurements to a
single supplier. Similarly, highly skilled craftsmen specializing in
nuclear-grade work such as reactor equipment installation have typically been
rotated from site to site. On the other hand, EdF has promoted inter-supplier
competition in areas such as civil works where there is generally less
potential for learning or static scale economies.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding comparisons have shown that there are substantial
differences between West Germany. France and Japan in the level of utility
involvement in nuclear power plant projects and in the degree of functional
integration in the supply industry. The discussion has also shown how, as a
result of these organizational differences, the relative contributions to
overall economic performance of production scale economies, transaction cost
economies and the efficiency gains of market competition have varied in the
three countries.
The German utilities have been the least actively involved in design and
construction, and the nuclear power plant supply process in Germany has most
closely approached the single contractor. turnkey plant model. In Japan the
scope of plant supply contracts has been almost as broad, but the utilities
have played a more active role in project management and quality assurance,
and also in design decisions. Electricit6 de France has acted as its own
architect-engineer and project anager from the outset, and enters into many
separate contracts for equipment and services, a large fraction of which are
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bid competitively.
By contracting almost exclusively with KWU, and more recently by adopting
the standard Convoy design, the German utilities have permitted whatever
economies of scale were available in the relatively small domestic market to
be exploited. The penalty associated with this strategy has been a general
absence of supply-side competition and a user-supplier relationship in which
the potential for supplier opportunism is considerable. Contractual
incentives, design standardization and regulatory stabilization have helped to
reduce the hazards of opportunism.
In Japan, the division of the nuclear plant market between three
suppliers has meant that potentially available scale economies have not been
exploited; and the offsetting benefits of market competition between suppliers
have been reduced by the utilities' practice of only building either PWRs or
BWRs. On the other hand, the risk of ex ost opportunism by Japanese plant
suppliers is lessened by a combination of contractual incentives, reduced
information asymmetries (as a result of the bigger utility role) and cultural
and institutional constraints on opportunistic behaviour.
In France, EdF has been able simultaneously to realize scale economies
and exploit market forces through a combination of design standardization and
work package disaggregation. The latter has led to increased contractor
coordination costs, but the penalties here have been lessened by the stable
environment in which the projects are conducted. Also, because of its size
and status as the sole French utility, EdF has been able to economize on
transaction costs by internalizing the project management and
architect-engineering functions without at the same time sacrificing scale
economies.
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The transaction cost approach cannot explain why these international
differences in project organization have arisen, since they are much less the
outcome of the formal economic optimization process assumed in the theory than
of state-specific combinations of industrial tradition, legal restrictions,
political initiatives and administrative planning. Neither is the transaction
cost framework sufficiently well developed to predict quantitatively how these
differences will affect economic performance. Nevertheless, within each
country the theory can provide useful qualitative insights into the likely
economic outcome of proposed organizational changes or of changes in the
external environment - for example, a shift away from the turnkey approach in
Germany, or a decline in the reactor ordering rate in France. And it can also
provide insights into why an organizational approach that is effective in one
national industrial and cultural context might be more or less effective in
another - for example, why a set of institutional arrangements that works well
when there is a general expectation of frequent ordering, and when there are
powerful cultural constraints on opportunistic behaviour, may be quite
unsuited to circumstances in which ordering is infrequent and opportunism is
more prevalent.
In addition to the organizational differences that we have observed,
several similarities also deserve emphasis. First, in each country a matching
of financial risk with technical control has been achieved, and the limits of
contractor responsibility are generally well defined. Second, in no case has
the project management function been delegated to an independent third party
firm. Either the utility acts as its own project manager (France), or it
delegates this responsibility to its prime contractor (Germany), or the
utility and the prime contractors share the task (Japan). Third, in all three
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countries the suppliers have maintained close links with the utilities after
their plants have gone into operation. Finally, in most instances the
expectation of both the utility and the supplier has been that the two will
collaborate on future projects.
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Table 3: Nuclear Power Plant Project Functional Responsibilities
West Germany Japan France
Turnkey
Design and engineering
Construction workforce
Construction management
Project management
Licensing
Quality assurance
Supply-side functional
integration
Yes
Supplier
Supplier
Supplier
Supplier
Supplier/Utility
Supplier
High
Yes
Supplier
Supplier
Supplier/Utility
Supplier/Utility
Utility
Utility/Supplier
High
No
Utility
Supplier
Utility
Utility
Utility
Utility
Low
FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION
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FIGURE 2
ALTERNATIVE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROJECT STRUCTURES
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APPENDIX
Interviews with the representatives of the following organizations were
conducted by the authors in West Germany during January 1986:
Federal Ministry of the Interior
Ministry of Trade and Commerce for North Rhine Westphalia
Gesellschaft fr Reaktorsicherheit (GRS - Reactor Safety Company)
Kerntechnischer Ausschuss (TA - Nuclear Safety Standards
Commission)
Technischer Uberwachungsverein (TUV) Rheinland (Technical
Surveillance Association for Rhineland)
Technische Vereinigung der Grosskraftwerksbetreiber (VCB -
Association of Large Power Producers)
Kraftwerk Union (KWU)
Badenwerk AG
Bayernwerk AG
Energieversorgung Schwaben AG (EVS)
Preussische Elektrizitits AG (Preussenelektra)
Rheinisch-Westfilisches Elektrizittswerk AG (RWE)
During April 1986, interviews in France were held with representatives
from several divisions in Framatome, and with officials of the Direction de
l'Equipement (Division of Engineering and Construction) of Electricit de
France (meetings were held both at division headquarters in Paris and at
SEPTEN in Lyon).
During 1983, 1984, and 1987 interviews were conducted with
representatives of Tokyo Electric Power, Kansai Electric Power, Chubu Electric
Power, Shikoku Electric Power, Tohoku Electric Power, the Japan Atomic Power
Company, the Electric Power Development Company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Toshiba Corporation, Hitachi Ltd., Shimizu Construction Company, the Japan
Atomic Industrial Forum, the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Science and Technology
Agency, and the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.
